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Procrustean1 Jurisprudence:
An Austrian School Economic Critique of
the Separation and Regulation of Liberties in

the Twentieth Century United States
INTRODUCTION

The beloved Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in his dissenting opinion
in Lochner v. New York3 denounced the majority for embracing an
economic theory of laissez-faire which according to him "a large part of the
country does not entertain. '4 Holmes went on to say that he did not
perceive it as his duty to decide cases based upon economic theory because
5
a "constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory."
Rather, it is made for "people of fundamentally differing views" which
7
through a majority enact their views into law. 6 Holmes, in Lochner,
would have upheld a labor law enacted by the state of New York which
prohibited a baker from entering into a voluntary exchange with his
employer to work more than 60 hours per week.8
The issue in Lochner should not have been which economic theory to
embrace. Rather, the issue should have been whether an individual has a
fundamental right to engage in voluntary exchanges.
2

1. Procrustes is a notorious giant robber from greek mythology who laid his victims
on an iron bed stretching them out or cutting off their legs to make them fit. In so doing,
Procrustes demonstrated an arbitrary and often ruthless disregard of individual differences or
special circumstances. The Procrustean Bed is defined as "a scheme or pattern into which
someone or something is arbitrarily forced." WEBsTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 918
(1976).
This article argues that the twentieth century "bench" has become the modern Procrustean
"bed" as the inextricably intertwined so-called fundamental and economic liberties have been
"forced" into an "arbitrary" separation scheme. This separation and disparate treatment by
the U.S. Supreme Court has allowed various governmental units in the twentieth century to
become modem Procrusteans, that is, this century's gigantic robbers.
2. The reader should not infer that because Holmes is beloved by many others, that
he is greatly apppreciated by this author.
3. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
4. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
5. Id. at 75.
6. Id. at 76.

7. Id.

8. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 45, 46 & 74 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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The science of economics so disparaged by Holmes remains a

touchstone by which such jurisprudential quandaries as Lochner9 may be
analyzed and evaluated.
Unfortunately, Holmes' dissent in Lochner'° was the beginning of the
end of the freedom to contract that had until then been highly regarded and
protected." In Nebbia v. New York,' 2 the United States Supreme Court,
in an attempt to separate economic liberties from those that would later
come to be known as fundamental liberties, started the nation down the
procrustean path of jurisprudential disaster and economic self-destruction. 3
Austrian School economist Ludwig Von Mises, in his epic treatise on
economics, Human Action, 14 foresaw the resulting demise of liberty and in
turn society which results when governments attempt to separate liberties
into economic and personal or fundamental realms:
The fallacy of this [in this case, Holmes'] argument
stems from the spurious distinction between two realms of
human life and action, entirely separated from one
another, viz., the "economic" sphere and the "noneconomic" sphere....
...as soon as the economic freedom which the market
economy grants to its members is removed, all political
liberties and bills of rights become humbug. 5

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See infra part I for a detailed commentary on the devolution of economic liberties
including freedom of contract.
12. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
13. See id. at 537 ("So far as the requirement of due process is concerned ... a state
is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public
welfare" thus separating the economic realm from other areas of constitutional protection);
see infra parts I-Ill, for further justification of this position.
14. LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION (3d rev. ed., 1966).
15. Id. at 285, 287. More completely, "The freedom to be abolished [by Holmes in
Lochner] is merely the spurious "economic" freedom of the capitalists that harms the
common man. Outside the "economic sphere" [it is said] freedom will not only be fully
preserved, but considerably expanded. . . . The fallacy of this [in this case, Holmes']
argument stems from the spurious distinction between two realms of human life and action,
entirely separated from one another, viz., the "economic" sphere and the "noneconomic"
sphere . . . As soon as the economic freedom which the market economy grants to its
members is removed, all political liberties and bills of rights become humbug. Freedom of
the press is a mere blind if the authority controls all printing offices and paper plants. And
so are all the other rights of men." (emphasis added).
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Holmes' first error in Lochner,16 was supposing that because people
do not believe a particular economic principle or law, it does not exist.
Economic laws based in sound theory, like laws of physics, exist whether
particular members or even the majority of a population believe them or not.
7
An early belief that the sun rotates around the earth held by most people
did and does not change the physical fact that the earth orbits the sun.'
Likewise, axioms and the economic laws and principles deduced from
them such as the law of diminishing marginal utility exist with or without
the individual's or majority's consent or belief.' 9 According to the
Austrian School of Economics, these axioms and logically derived principles
scientifically demonstrate that societal utility can only be maximized by a
non-interventionist (laissez-faire) system of laws and property rights.20
Ignoring the wisdom of Mises and other Austrian economists has
resulted in nearly sixty-five years of irreconcilable and necessarily inept
court decisions encouraging the need to create a "right to privacy" from the
so-called penumbras of what were otherwise amendments protective of
property rights; namely the first, third and fourth. 2'
Secondly, Holmes' (while claiming to disavow any economic system)
erred in failing to realize that by refusing to embrace what he called the
"economic theory ... of laissez-faire, '22 he by default endorsed "bringing
about socialism by successive measures. '23 By legally legitimizing state
regulation of labor laws, milk boards,25 and other casts of central
16. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
17. DONALD KAGAN ET. AL., THE WESTERN HERITAGE SINCE 1648 500 (2d ed. 1983)
"Nicholas Copernicus's view [was] of the universe with the sun in the center." The view that
dominated astronomy through the sixteenth century was that of Ptolemy, who put the earth
at the center of the universe. Id.
18. Id.

19. See MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY, AND STATE: A TREATISE ON
ECONOMIC PRiNcIPLES 20-21 (rev. ed. 1993) [hereinafter ROTHBARD-STATE]. The law of

diminishing marginal utility simply stated is "[F]or all human actions, as the quantity of the
supply (stock) of a good increases, the utility (or value) of each additional unit decreases."
This is logically true because as the units are given up, the least urgent of the wants that
could have been satisfied with those units are those first foregone. Id.; see also infra part
II.G.
20. See infra parts II.E, G-H for full development of this conclusion.
21. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-85 (1965).
22. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
23. VON MISES, supra note 14, at 259. "The 'socialization' of individual plants, shops,
and farms-that is their transfer from private into public ownership-is a method of bringing
about socialism by successive measures." Id.
24. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426
(1917).
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planners in the name of the collective good, the United States Supreme
Court allowed the state to control capital and the uses to which it is put.
Socialism is often defined as an economic system wherein the state
owns the means of production. 26 However, the destructive effects of
socialism are at least as disastrous when the state, through regulation,
controls the means of production.2 7 It is, of course, without taking title,
theoretically possible through regulation to control capital, be it human or
otherwise, to the extent its use is totally controlled by the state. Here we
have capitalism in name only because while titles to capital goods are held
by private individuals, the state controls them as if they were the title
holder. 28 This may actually be worse than socialism as it is usually
thought of because any liability resulting from whatever state ordained uses
the capital may be put to may still be assessed against the "title holder."29
Holmes states, dissenting in Lochner,30 that he would require considerably more study if he were to make decisions with respect to economic
32
theory.3 1 On this point, Holmes was certainly correct.
Holmes and his progeny's gravest errors, however, are the subject of
this comment. First, that economic liberties are inherently different from
fundamental liberties, and as such can somehow not only be separated, but
should be afforded different levels of scrutiny and protection under the
United States Constitution. And secondly, that the redistributive effects of
the collective force of economic regulation allegedly enacted for the
common good, actually benefits society as a whole and is rational, such that
it can survive the minimal "rational basis test" of constitutional review. 33
To the separation and disparate treatment of liberties the Austrian School

25. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); United States v. Carolene Prods.,
304 U.S. 144 (1938).
26. ROGER LEROY MILLER, ECONOMICS TODAY 24 (7th ed. 1991).

27.

HANS-HERMANN HOPPE, A THEORY OF SOCIALISM AND CAPITALISM

66 (1989)

[hereinafter HOPPE-THEORY].
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J.,dissenting).
31. Id. at 65.
32. It is argued throughout this comment in parts 1, II, and III, that any sound
understanding of economic theory would have prevented Holmes from disassociating
economics from constitutional rights-analysis as he did in his Lochner dissent.
33. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955). "But the law need not
be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that
there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular
legislative measure was a rational way to correct it." Id.
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says "humbug."' To the redistributive effects of socio-economic regulatoirrational. 3 5
ry action, the Austrian School demonstrates it is "inherently
Over time, certain standards of review in the tradition of natural law
have been used in an attempt to balance the importance of certain liberties
with state responsibility for order and to distinguish the so-called economic
36
liberties from the so-called fundamental liberties. These include "implicit
3" "lie[s] at the base of all our civil and
in the concept of ordered liberty,"
political institutions,"3 "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental,"3 9 and "that fundamental fairness
essential to the very concept of justice."' (Strong originalist constitutional
law arguments have also been proffered for preservation of these so-called
4
economic liberties under the Ninth Amendment.) '
According to constitutional law scholar Bernard Siegan, "such a
collection of catchwords and catch phrases 42would fill pages, but would not
be very helpful in establishing guidelines.
The Austrian School of Economics

43

provides the scientific touchstone

for escaping the judicial trap of "catchwords and catch phrases""4 identified
by Siegan as those vague guidelines which justices throughout the history
4 5 Ironically,
of this country have attempted to rely upon unsuccessfully.
this touchstone lies within the very science Holmes attempted to disassociate
6
from constitutional law in his Lochner dissent, that is, economics.
As argued below, the Austrian School of economics not only demonstrates that there could be no rational basis for the redistributive transfers of
wealth from consumers to producers in economic regulatory cases such as

34. See VON

MISES,

supra note 14, at 285, 287; see also supra note 15.

35. See infra parts II.E, H, K, and L.

36. BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTrTUTION 248 (1980).

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
REv. 419

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926).
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
Randy E. Barnett, A Ninth Amendment for Today's Constitution, 26 VAL. U. L.
(1991).

42. SIEGAN, supra note 36, at 208.

43. The Austrian School of Economics is best described as the science of praxeology
or human action. The Austrian methodology remains distinct from other schools of economic
thought in both its strict adherence to subjective value theory and its derivation of economic
laws using deductive reasoning from a priori propositions. ROBERT FORMAINI, THE MYTH
OF SCIENTIFIC PUBLIC POLICY 23-25 (1990).

44. SIEGAN, supra note 36, at 206.
45. Id.
46. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Nebbia,47 United States v. Carolene Products Co.,48 Williamson v. Lee
Optical,49 but demonstrates that separation of economic from fundamental
liberties is simply impossible.'
Rather, the Austrian School definitively demonstrates that the
libertarian"1 shibboleth for which.Holmes held apparent contempt, that is,
"the liberty of the [individual] citizen to do as he likes so long as he does
not interfere with the liberty of others to do the same,"52 would be the only
rational jurisprudential philosophy to embrace given that maximum
productivity and just distribution are indeed societal goals.
In chastising the dismal science and attempting to separate jurisprudence from it, Holmes and his judicial progeny have also increased the level
of uncertainty and the economic stagnation which necessarily results from
that uncertainty.5 3 By legally allowing decisionmaking to be shifted from
the consumers to central planners ("three men at headquarters")54 who are
without market signals, allocative efficiency is also necessarily reduced.55
By attempting to do the scientifically impossible, that is separate liberty
from property and economic reality from jurisprudence, Holmes and the
Supreme Court have constructed the modern Procrustean bed upon which
individual liberty has become similarly mythical.
Part I of this article details the historical treatment of liberties and the
often vague notions and phrases under which they were generally protected
prior to the Nebbia56 decision. The subsequent withering and ensuing
procrusteanism and the right to privacy retrenchment is also discussed. Part
II introduces the basic theoretical tenets of the Austrian School of Economics necessary to the understanding of Part III. Part III utilizes the precepts
in Part II to identify more specifically why the separation of liberties is
scientifically impossible (as well as nonsensical and inconsistent) and why
the regulation of pareto superior5 7 liberties cannot withstand even the

47. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).

48. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
49. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).

50. See VON MisEs, supra note 14, at 285, 287; see also supra note 15; infra part III.
51. MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, FOR A NEW LIBERTY 23 (rev. ed. 1978) [hereinafter
ROTHBARD-LIBERTY] ("The libertarian creed rests upon one central axiom: that no man or
group of men may aggress against the property of person of anyone else.").
52. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
53. See infra part I.C.1.
54. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 558 (1934) (McReynolds J., dissenting).
55. See infra part 11.1 for a detailed explanation.
56. SIEGAN, supra note 36, at 139 ("The [Nebbia] decision was historically significant
because it signalled the approaching end of economic due process.").
57. MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, THE EThICS OF LIBERTY 203 (1982) [hereinafter
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minimal low-level judicial scrutiny of the rational basis test. Included are
case examples in which the procrustean path taken by modem jurisprudence
is demonstrated to be hopelessly flawed and applies the theoretical tenets of
Part III to their proper resolution. The article concludes by recommending
a total recall of the twentieth century's jurisprudential procrusteanism to
include the economic history resulting from lying on its Procrustean bed.
I. BACKGROUND-THE DEVOLUTION AND SEPARATION OF LIBERTIES
The precepts of the Austrian School of economics, argued by this
article to provide a scientific basis for this non-separability and protection
of rights, could not have been relied upon by the constitutional framers for
support because Austrian thought developed later in history than the
5"
Rather, what Siegan described as
formation of the U.S. Constitution.
"catchwords and catch phrases"59 often originating in natural law theory
served as the unstable touchstone of the United States' Constitutional
protection of liberties.
Beginning in the progressive era, much like sandstone, that touchstone
crumbled under the pressure of economic self-interested corporate liberalism
as, under the guise of serving the public interest,' regulation enacted to
benefit one group at the expense of another 6 (made possible by judicial
abdication of the economic rights of the individual), became not only the
rule but, more sadly, the rule of law.62
In 1848, French political economist and journalist Frederic Bastiat
wrote an essay entitled The Law63 in which he argued that "life, liberty,

ROTHBARD-ETHICS] (stating that pareto superior actions are those actions by which the utility
of at least one person is increased while the utility of no one else is decreased).
58. HENRY WILLIAM SPIEGEL, THE GROWTH OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 530 (3d ed.
1991) Carl Menger, the co-discoverer of the marginal principle, of the subjective theory of
value, and founder of the Austrian School of economics, lived from 1840-1921. Id.
59. See SIEGAN, supra note 36, at 208.
60. JAMES WEINSTEIN, THE CORPORATE IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE: 1900-1918
(1968) (Mr. Weinstein discusses two essential aspects of the liberal state as it developed in
the progressive era. The first was the need of many of the largest corporations to have the
government (usually the federal government) intervene in economic matters to protect against
"irresponsible business conduct" and to assure stability in marketing and financial affairs.).
See generally ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES INTHE GROWTH
OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, Chapter 6 (1987).
61. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 548 (1934) (McReynolds, J., dissenting) ("It
[such economic regulation] imposes direct and arbitrary burdens on those already seriously
impoverished with the alleged immediate design of affording special benefits to others.").
62. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
63. FREDERIC BASTIAT, THE LAW, (Dean Russell trans., Foundation for Economic
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and property do not exist because men have made laws. Rather, it was the
fact that life, liberty, and property existed that caused men to make laws in
the first place."'64 Bastiat made this observation to demonstrate that the
purpose of the law's creation was nothing more than an efficient step taken
to jointly protect property from expropriation.
This understanding was reiterated by the Supreme Court as recently as
1993 by Clarence Thomas: "The great end for which men entered into
society, was to secure their property."65 Any attempt by a group to
collectively deprive the individual of his property would have been
antithetical to this basis for the individuals entering into such a property
protecting "contract" in the first place.
Thus, the principle of collective right-its reason for existing, its
lawfulness-is based on individual right because the common force that
protects this collective right cannot be logically justified to have any other
function than that for which it acts as a surrogate.'
A. EARLY RIGHTS RECOGNITION

An early recognition of (1) the non-separability of so-called economic
and fundamental liberties, (2) broadly defined rights, (3) the importance of
judicial protection of such rights against collective (legislative) debasement,
and (4) what can and cannot qualify as a right, is obvious from the writings
6
of Constitutional framers 67 and early U.S. Supreme Court Justices. 1
James Madison stated "In a word, as a man is said to have a right to
his property, he may be equally said to have a property in his rights."69

Education 1987) (1853) [hereinafter BASTIAT-LAW].
64. Id. at 6.
65. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S.Ct. 492, 515 (1993)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.
St. Tr. 1029, 1066 (C.P. 1765)).
66. BASTIAT-LAW, supra note 63, at 7.
67. James A. Dorn, JudicialProtectionof Economic Liberties,in ECONOMIC LIBERTIES
AND THE JUDICIARY 4 (James A. Dorn & Henry G. Manne eds. 1987). That James Madison
held freedom of contract and other economic liberties in high regard is discernable by the
following passage from his essay entitled Property: "If the United States mean to obtain or
deserve the full praise due to wise and just governments, they will equally respect the rights
of property, and the property in rights." Id. (emphasis added).
68. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 387-88 (1798) ("A law that punished a citizen for
an innocent action... [or] . . . impairs the lawful private contracts of citizens; ... or a law
that takes property from A gives it to B: it is against all reason and justice, for a people to
intrust a legislature with such powers.").
69. Dorn, supra note 67, at 3.
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John Locke, who greatly influenced Jefferson in his writings contained
in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution's Bill of Rights,
argued that man had natural rights to life, liberty, and property and that the
state itself does not furnish new or independent rights subject to its
controls. °
The framers of the U.S. Constitution as well as Justices in formulating
"natural law" and "ordered concept of liberty" arguments relied on
Jeffersonian and Lockean natural law theory.7" As such, framers attempted
to protect economic liberties and property rights. James Madison, generally
regarded property as "that dominion which one man claims and exercises
over the external things of the world, in exclusion of every other individual."72 More than that, Madison described that property, "[in its largerand
juster meaning, it embraces every thing to which a man may attach a value
and have a right; and which leaves to everyone else the like advantage.""3
According to Madison, this property right included a person's property in
his [their] opinions, and in the profession and practice dictated by them
[religious opinions], a property very dear to him in the safety and liberty of
his person, and an equal property in the free use of faculties, and a free
choice of the objects on which to employ them.74
This, of course, constituted a much broader definition of rights and
property than is currently recognized. An erosion of property rights this
broadly defined was a concern foreseen by the Constitutional framers.75
The judiciary was thus empowered to prevent the legislature from what is
the legislative and interest group tendency to engage in redistribution from
one group of the electorate to another.76 The judiciary was regarded as
"the government entity that was esteemed above all others as a counterweight to popular rule and some of the earliest statements favorable to
judicial review were directed toward legislative attempts to interfere with
property rights.

77

Another important insight provided within Madison's writing which
would appear to be a long lost consideration of modern jurisprudence is the
ascertaining of what can and cannot be a right. Madison's phrase (italicized

70. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 12 (1985).
71. SIEGAN, supra note 36, at 35-36.
72. Kozinski in ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE JUDICIARY 4, supra note 67, at 3.
73. Id. (emphasis added).
74. Id.
75. SIEGAN, supra note 36, at 88.
76. Id.
77. Id. (emphasis added).

NORTHERN IWLNOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15

above), "and which leaves to every one else the like advantage,"' is a vital
notion which serves as a tool for discerning rights from preferences or pipe
dreams. The notion is that of universality. An alleged right cannot be a
right unless it can be "universalized" or enjoyed by all individuals simultaneously without being internally contradictory.79
Attempting to apply the notion of universality to modern "rights" makes
them rather suspect. When attempting to grant rights status to more than
one's own level of production, one must ask at whose expense this is to be
provided. For if some individuals are entitled by right to the products of the
works of others, it means that those others at the same time are deprived of
rights and condemned to slave labor. '°
Trying to universalize a right to income without work would necessitate
that everyone could have income without work. Clearly this is internally
inconsistent. For any person to have income would require that at least one
person be engaged in production. It was this notion of universality that
prompted Bastiat to write "the state is that great fictitious entity by which
everyone seeks to live at the expense of everyone else." 8'
The pareto superior actions of voluntary exchange (contract), self
ownership, production, and homesteading were generally more respected by
the higher courts throughout much of the nineteenth century. 2
In addition to constitutional framers embracing the broad, non-separable
and universality notions of rights, 3 early Supreme Court decisions
recognized the principles established by the framers and held them sacred.
In 1798, Justice Samuel Chase, signer of the Declaration of Independence, wrote in an opinion that:
The purposes for which men enter into society will
determine the nature and terms of the social compact; and
as they are the foundation of the legislative power, they
will decide what are the proper objects of it ... An act of
the legislature (for I cannot call it a law), contrary to the
great first principles of the social compact, cannot be
considered a righful [sic] exercise of legislative authority.
78. Dorn, supra note 67, at 3 (quoting Madison's Property).
79. See HANS-HERMANN HOPPE, THE ECONOMICS AND ETHICS OF PRIVATE PROPERTY
182 (1993) [hereinafter HOPPE-PROPERTY].

80. Id. at 292.
81. FREDERIC BASTIAT, SELECTED ESSAYS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY (1969).
82. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213
(1827); Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. 43 (1815); Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. 627 (1829);
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
83. See supra notes 67, 69-78.
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A law that punished a citizen for an innocent action
a law that impairs the lawful private contracts of
citizens; . . .or a law that takes property from A and
gives it to B: it is against all reason and justice, for a
people to intrust a legislature with such powers; and
therefore it cannot be presumed that they have done it.
The genius, the nature and the spirit of our state governments, amount to a prohibition of such acts of legislation;
and the general principles of law and reason forbid
them."
*

. .

A series of cases in the early nineteenth century further solidified a
Constitutional basis for liberties now regarded by the Court as "mere"
economic liberties.85 This is not to say that the Constitution is divine or
perfect but rather to establish that the economic system of pareto superior
actions and property rights to be identified in Austrian theory as maximizing
of societal utility were originally recognized as of equal importance in the
early judicial interpretations of the Constitution. In Fletcher v. Peck86 and
Ogden v. Saunders,87 Chief Justice Marshall strongly asserted that this
right to contract is brought into society and "originates from the right which
every man retains, to acquire property, to dispose of that property according
to his own judgment, and to pledge himself to a future act."88
Justice Story in Terrett v. Taylor?9 and Wilkinson v. Leland,9' reaffirmed Marshall's earlier dissenting opinion arguing that the "fundamental
maxims of a free government seem to require, that the rights of personal
liberty and private property should be held sacred." 9' Further, Story added
that:
no court of justice in this country would be warranted in
assuming, that the power to violate and disregard them-a
power so repugnant to the common principles of justice
and civil liberty-lurked under any general grant of
legislative authority; or ought to be implied from any
general expressions of the will of the people. The people

84. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 387-88 (1798).
85. See cases cited supra note 82.
86. 10 U.S. 87 (1810).

87.
88.
89.
90.

25 U.S. 213 (1827).
Ogden v. Saunders, 24 U.S. 213, 246-47 (1827).
13 U.S. 43 (1815).
27 U.S. 627 (1829).

91. Id. at 657.
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ought not to be presumed to part with rights so vital to
their security and well-being..."'
B. EROSION OF THE PROPERTY IN RIGHTS

The so-called economic rights and rights to property, which "eighteenth
century political leaders looked to the judiciary for the safeguarding of,"93
began an unfortunate and quick erosion in the early twentieth century as
courts allowed governments to interfere with freedom of contracts "affected
with a public interest.""
Disregarding the rights of the individual in a quest to serve the socalled public interest allowed for an opening of the proverbial flood gates
as special interests began to act through legislative bodies to dictate what
"affects" the public interest. 95
In Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Regulations,96 Chief
Justice Taft wrote that while the food business in question did not sufficiently affect the public interest so as to be denied freedom of contract,97 four
categories of business did justify public regulation: (1) Those carried on
under authority of a public franchise, (2) certain occupations regarded as
exceptional ... e.g. inns, cabs, and grist mills, (3) businesses in which an
economic monopoly exists98 or is likely to occur, and (4) businesses that
are so important in the nation's economy that destruction or stoppage would
endanger the public welfare. 99
The collective or public interest is a dangerous end when justified by
a Constitution formed to protect the rights of the individual because it
necessitates group classification and individuals belong to more than one
group."° Taft's rationale soon became a dangerous interventionary wedge

92. Id.
93. SIEGAN, supra note 36, at 88.
94. WILLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN D. VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 524 (9th ed. 1993). Under the guise of protecting the public from itself, the
socio-economic regulatory cases were upheld. "A long line of cases developed marking out
the distinction between ordinary businesses and those affected with a public interest and so
subject to price regulations." Id.
95. See generally WEINSTEIN, supra note 60.
96. 262 U.S. 522 (1923).
97. Id. at 538.
98. Austrian School economists argue that the Sherman Antitrust Act was the product
of special interest rent-seeking. See Thomas J. DiLorenzo, The Origins of Antitrust: An
Interest Group Perspective, 5 INTL. REV. L. & ECON. 73 (1985).
99. Wolff Packing Co., 262 U.S. at 535, 538 (1923).
100. See infra part III.A.
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of government into the operations of the market, freedom of contract, and
property rights.

In 1934, not long after Taft's Wolff decision sustained the existing

freedom of contract for the food industry, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a 5-4
decision, upheld the right of the New York legislature to enact a law to
establish a minimum retail price for milk.'0 ' This law was enacted after
dairy prices were "brilliantly discovered" by a New York legislative
committee (likely after substantial hints from the organized dairy producers)
to have fallen below the costs of production. Mr. Nebbia operated a small
store in Rochester where he sold two bottles of milk and a loaf of bread for
eighteen cents and was charged with a misdemeanor as the minimum selling
price by legislative edict was nine cents per bottle of milk.
In criticizing the majority opinion in Nebbia v. New York,' °2 Justice
McReynolds, in his dissent, asked the rhetorical question: "Are federal rights
subject to extinction by reports of committees?! 10 3 He answered his own
question by saying "Heretofore, they have not been. '' 4 McReynolds went
on to expose the regulatory action for what it was: a violation of the rights
of the storekeeper, of the liberty of twelve million consumers, and a transfer
of wealth from those seriously impoverished to milk producers.'0 5
°6
Justice McReynolds concluded the dissenting opinion in Nebbia'
with the economic insight that continues to be grossly lacking in decisions
that have allowed preferred production of some goods over others, wealth
redistribution, government imposed price and wage legislation, and many

101. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
102. Id.
103. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 548-49 (1934) (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 551, 557-58 (McReynolds, J., dissenting), ("The exigency is of the kind
which inevitably arises when one set of men continue to produce more than all others can
buy. The distressing result to the producer followed his ill-advised but voluntary efforts.
Similar situations occur in almost every business. If here we have an emergency sufficient
to empower the Legislature to fix sales prices, then whenever there is too much or too little
of an essential thing ... constitutional provisions may be declared inoperative. Not only
does the statute interfere arbitrarily with the rights of the little grocer to conduct his business
according to the standards long accepted ... but it takes away the liberty of twelve million
consumers to buy a necessity of life in an open market. It imposes direct and arbitrary
burdens upon those already seriously impoverished with the alleged immediate design of
affording special benefits to others. To him with less than nine cents it says-You cannot
procure a quart of milk from the grocer although he is anxious to accept what you can pay
and the demands of your household are urgent! A superabundance; but no child can
purchase from a willing storekeeper below the figure appointed by three men at headquarters!").
106. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 557-58 (1934) (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
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other interferences with actions demonstrated to be pareto superior and the
notion of universality by arguing that:
The Legislature cannot lawfully destroy guaranteed rights
of one man with the prime purpose of enriching another,
even if for the moment, this may seem advantageous to
the public .... Grave concern for embarrassed farmers is
everywhere; but this should neither obscure the rights of
others nor obstruct judicial appraisement of measures
proposed for relief. The ultimate welfare of the producer,
like that of every other class, requires dominance of the
Constitution. And zealously to uphold this in all its parts
is the highest duty intrusted to the courts."
Justice McReynolds' reputation of being opposed to "democratic
progress" because of his outspoken judicial attacks on Roosevelt's New Deal
Policies has lasted through the present day." 8 These attacks were
launched in an attempt to preserve economic liberties described above as in
the tradition of Locke, Jefferson,'0 9 and Bastiat."0 McReynolds did not
see himself as endorsing a laissez-faire economic system over any other
economic system."' Rather he endeavored only to "protect the inalienable
rights of the individual."" 2 These same rights were to be denied by Justice Holmes in his goal to disenfranchise Constitutional law'from economic
reasoning.'' 3
The erosion of rights has become so complete that if one looks at the
outcome of cases challenging socio-economic regulatory legislation under
due process, it would appear that no effective review is undertaken by the
Court." 4 Since the 1937 demise of substantive due process, no socio107. Id.

108. JAMES E. BOND, I DISSENT: THE LEGACY OF CHIEF JUSTICE JAMES CLARK

McREYNOLDS 136-37 (1992).

109. Id.

110. See BASTIAT-LAW, supra note 63, at 6.
111. BOND, supra note 108, at 136-37.

112. Id.at 136-37 ("McReynolds' constitutional views were those of Jefferson, as they
had been transmitted to him by a father born in the heyday of Jacksonian democracy. The
Jeffersonian view to which McReynolds adhered rested on a sound exposition of legal
principles rooted in the precedents reaching back to the beginning of the American Republic.
The Justice's voice thus echoed from the distant past, and it seemed outdated to twentieth
century Americans. Yet he did see himself as the midwife, delivering the future still-born.
He did not consciously seek to make the world safe for capitalism or the capitalist. He
sought only to make it safe for the individual citizen to exercise his inalienable rights.").
113. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905).
114. SIEGAN, supra note 36, at 17.
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economic regulatory statute has been held invalid on the ground that it
violated due process." 5
C. RETRENCHMENT AND INVENTION OF A RIGHT TO PRIVACY

After nearly thirty years of no economic regulatory statute being held
invalid" 6 under the "rational basis test" ' 7 for economic regulation, the
U.S. Supreme Court in 1965 retrenched"' and completed construction of
the Procrustean bed" 9 for which this article is titled.
The Court in Griswold v. Connecticut" confronted the problem of
how to deal with state legislative restraints on liberties that many people
regarded as extremely important but that are not even remotely referred to
in any constitutional provision and that the Framers of the original
Constitution or the Fourteenth Amendment never imagined.' 2'
Justice Douglas said that the Connecticut statute in Griswold, 22
making criminal the use of any drug, article, or instrument intended to
prevent human conception, raised an entirely different issue because it
affected an intimate relationship between husband and wife. 23 He stated,
"We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and
propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social
conditions. This law, however, operates directly on an intimate relation to
husband and wife and their physician's role in one aspect of that relation."124
In contrast, delivering the majority opinion in Williamson v. Lee
Optical,-5 Justice Douglas upheld a law which he stated may exact a
needless, wasteful requirement disallowing opticians from dispensing and
duplicating eyeglasses. In Williamson,16 something less than the rational
basis was used to uphold the economic regulation. Douglas stated "[i]t is
enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be
thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955); see supra note 33.

118. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
119. See supra note 1 for a detailed description of this phrase.
120. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
121. SIEGAN, supra note 36, at 16.

122. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
123. Id.
at 482.
124. Id.
125. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
126. Id.at 483.
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it."'27 (Not that there actually must be a rational basis for the legislature's
actions, but only that there might be!)
According to Siegan, "applying a pre-1937 substantive due process
analysis, the Court might have disposed of the case in the following manner:
By selling a professional service to married couples, the defendants were
exercising liberty of contract. Connecticut's ban would have been an
arbitrary and unjustifiable infringement of this liberty."'12 As a post-1937
and especially as a post-Williamson'29 decision, however, Justice Douglas
to be consistent should have ruled that if there was an evil at hand for
correction, (here Connecticut even identified the evil as "promiscuous or
illicit sexual relationships" as opposed to the Court speculating as to reasons
in Williamson)'30 and the particular legislative measure might be thought
a rational way to correct it, the prohibition against contraceptive devices
should have been upheld as just another garden variety socio-economic
regulation.13 ' Rather, Douglas ruled the legislative enactment violated the
newly fabricated right to privacy, which he discovered within the penumbras
from
of specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights "formed by ' emanations
32
substance."'
and
life
them
give
help
that
those guarantees
Justice Douglas in his decision mentions the First, Third, Fourth and
1 33
The First
Ninth Amendments as origins for this right to privacy.
and could
ownership
self
assume
must
association
of
Amendment's freedom
their will
against
another
not propose that one has the right to associate with
34 The Third Amendment's "prohibition of the quarteron their property.
ing of' soldiers in any house in time of peace without the consent of the
amendment. 35
owners" could certainly be regarded as a property rights
The Fourth Amendment guaranteeing the "right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures" could also be easily reconciled as nothing more than a right
from property interference by the state. 36 The Ninth Amendment pro127. Id. at 488.
128. SIEGAN, supra note 36, at 17.
129. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
130. Id. at 488.
131. This is only to say that the liberty (action) in question could be just as easily
analyzed as a freedom of contract issue as that of a "right to privacy."
132. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
133. Id.
134. See infra notes 134-36, 392-94 and part III.B (stating that notions of property
become totally meaningless in the absence of fundamental liberties being limited by legal
property principles of trespass, etc.).
135. Id.
136. Id.
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vides that the enumeration of certain rights in the Constitution shall not be
construed to disparage others retained by the people. 137 Might this
Amendment then not protect the right to dispense replacement specta13
cles? 1
Additionally, Justice Douglas attempted to use seniority as a justification for his right to privacy in stating, "We deal with a right of privacy older
than the Bill of Rights-older than our political parties, older than our
school system. 3 9 Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse,
hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred."' 4' But
according to Justice Brown, laws forbidding marriage are technically an
interference in the freedom of contract 41 meaning that freedom of contract
must be at least as old as the variety of contract known as marriage.
Therefore, if seniority is the criteria, to be consistent, freedom of contract
must be afforded the same level of protection from state interference.
Property, by the same token, as indicated in the ideas of Bastiat, 142 Locke
and Jefferson, 143 must be even older, for without property what would
there have been to contract with or enter into society for!?
So-called fundamental liberties were redefined in "right to privacy"
cases heard subsequent to Griswold. 44 Under Roe v. Wade,145 strict
scrutiny was applied to an infringement of a woman's right to privacy in
making a decision to terminate her pregnancy. 46 In Bowers v. Hardwick, 147 the right of privacy was determined not to go so far as to protect
every kind of sexual conduct between consenting adults and more specifically did not include homosexual acts even if conducted in the privacy of one's
14
own home. 1

137. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
138. Id. (Nowhere in the enumerated powers of the U.S. Constitution is the right to
dispense or regulate dispensation of eyewear delegated to state or national governments.).
139. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
140. Id. at 486.
141. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 545 (1896).
142. See BASTIAT-LAW, supra note 63 and accompanying text.
143. See EPSTEIN, supra note 70.
144. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
145. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
146. Id. at 155. While the words strict scrutiny do not exist in the text of the opinion,
the opinion states that abortion fits within private rights subject only to certain state interests.

Id.

147. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
148. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91.
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In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,49 Justice O'Connor describes
within the ambit of the right to privacy "personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education as involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy as
At the
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."'
heart of liberty, she states, is the right to "define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life."15' According to O'Connor, beliefs about these matters "could not
define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of
the State."' 52
D. OTHER SO-CALLED FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES

Thus, after Griswold v. Connecticut,'53 there exists the minimal
rational basis test" for reviewing the constitutionality of economic
regulation while so-called fundamental liberties, in order to pass constitutional muster, must be "narrowly tailored to address compelling state
interests.""'
Beside those fundamental liberties of marriage and family identified in
Griswold5 6 within the rubric of the "right to privacy,"' 57 other fundamental liberties are recognized by the Court as so fundamental as to require
stricter scrutiny in their protection. "The Court has held that the rights to
certain personal privacies, to travel, to equal access to the criminal appellate
process, and to vote, are fundamental and therefore, it subjects governmental
restraints upon them to strict scrutiny."'
The seemingly ironic twist in the aforementioned jurisprudence is that
the Court is more protective of rights not even mentioned in the Constitution
yet provides little or no protection for those rights specifically delineated. 159
149. 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).
150. Planned Parenthood, 112 S.Ct. at 2807.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
154. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
155. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
156. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
157. Id. at 485; see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 549
(1977).
158. SIEGAN, supra note 36, at 207.
159. Id. As seen in Griswold, a right need not be mentioned specifically in the
Constitution in order to be designated as fundamental. The Court has held that the rights to
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In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio," ° fundamental rights
described as "almost impregnable to invasion"1 61 included freedoms of
speech, press, and religion, freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, the
right of association, and the right to vote. These rights were used as a
justification to strike as unconstitutional a housing ordinance which
prohibited grandchildren of different parents from residing simultaneously
in their grandmother's home. 162
E. THE PROCRUSTEAN "FALSE DICHOTOMY"

Justice Stevens, concurring in Moore,163 argued that the "critical
question is whether East Cleveland's housing ordinance is a permissible
restriction on the grandmother's right to use her own property as she sees
fit." 1 Had the case been tried on those property rights grounds rather
than a privacy right, like all other economic regulatory actions since 1937,
the fate of at least one of Ms. Moore's grandchildren would have been
rather suspect.16 5 As Justice Stevens points out, this artificial separation
results in what Justice Stewart in 1972 had described as a false dichotomy
between property rights and personal liberties.6
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.1 67
However, when freedom to contract for a marital partner'" or for the
services of an abortionist became issues for the twentieth century's "Court
of fundamental liberties," a sudden retrenchment in the way of the higher
level of judicial scrutiny requiring "narrowly tailored means to address a
compelling state interest"' 69 to uphold so-called fundamental liberty
regulation became the test.
Of course, all these issues could have been and had been reconcilable
within the system of rights to property and the property in rights embraced
certain personal privacies, to travel, to equal access to the criminal appellate process, and to
voting are fundamental and therefore it subjects restraints upon them to strict scrutiny. Thus,
the anomalous situation exists which accords higher priority to rights nowhere mentioned in
the Constitution than is allocated to the right of property which is specifically recognized in
the Fifth Amendment. Id.
160. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
161. Id. at 548-49.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 513 (Stevens, J., concurring).
165. See SIEGAN, supra note 36, at 17.
166. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
167. See SIEGAN, supra note 36, at 207.
168. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
169. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
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7°
Having
by the eighteenth and nineteenth century Supreme Courts.
phrases
catch
as
catchwords
same
the
abdicated those rights using many of
7
argued to be too vague to protect the so-called economic liberties,' ' the
72
Court used similar catchwords and phrases in cases like Griswold and
Moore'" to invent a "right to privacy" to preserve the so-called fundamental liberties.' 74
These highly subjective notions of what rights should be Constitutionally protected with different levels of scrutiny have led us to the false dichoto' induced Procrustean state of chaos which is the subject matter of
my "75
this comment.

II. THE AUSTRIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS

The eroding natural law touchstone for protection of individual liberties
should be replaced by the sound propositions of Austrian School's scientific
tenets. To Holmes notion that "general propositions do not decide concrete
cases, rather that decisions should depend on judgment or intuition more
subtle than any articulate major premise,"' 76 this author contends that
Procrusteanism thrives in a jurisprudence without principle.
Rather, good propositions and the principles derived from them, make
for sound case disposition. As the past sixty years 77of history suggests,
Procrustean propositions make for schizophrenic law.
Part II provides the necessary theoretical understanding to slay the
modem Procrustean jurisprudential robber and demonstrates the necessity of
adherence to the legal principle of protecting pareto superior actions' as
defined in Part I and detailed in Section A below. The tool of analysis used
in this article for determining that personal and so-called economic liberties
are inextricably intertwined is the economic theory of the Austrian School.

170. See infra part I.A.
171. See SIEGAN, supra note 36, at 208.
172. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
173. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
174. See infra part I.C.
175. See generally David M. Burke, The Presumption of ConstitutionalityDoctrine and
the Rehnquist Court: A Lethal Combinationfor Individual Liberty, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 73, 163-73 (1994).
176. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
177. See generally infra part III.
178. See ROTHBARD-ETHICS, supra note 57; see also infra part II.H.
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A. BACKGROUND

The Austrian School of Economics is best described as the science of
praxeology, that is, human action. 9 All human actions (purposeful
behavior thus excepting reflexes) involve the use of scarce means in an
attempt to maximize the acting individual's utility. 8 ° All of these actions
involve the use of at least some economic goods, that is, those perceived as
scarce.18' Examples here include one's own body, time, and the ground
required for the physical space one's body occupies in that none of us are
free floating spirits.' 82
The Austrian methodology' 83 remains uniquely distinct from other
schools of economic thought in its strict adherence to subjective value
theory and its derivation of economic laws using deductive reasoning from
a priori propositions.'8 As well as-being unique in its methodology,
application of this Austrian theory often results in conclusions strikingly
different from those of other economic schools of thought. 85 These
conclusions most generally favor free markets unfettered by government
intervention as a means of maximizing society's utility." 6
B. HUMAN ACTION

Humans act in an attempt to improve their condition by using means
or scarce resources to achieve ends or goals that provide higher levels of
satisfaction.'8 7 That humans act is a priori true. Any attempt to disprove
this notion would be internally inconsistent because the very "attempt to

179. VON MISES, supra note 14, at 12-13.

180. Id. at 13-14.
181. ROTHBARD-STATE, supra note 19, at 3-4.
182. Id. at 3-6.
183. FORMAINI, supra note 43, at 23-25. The modem Austrian approach to the study
of economics developed along lines very different from those prevailing in the British
Classical tradition. The major relevant difference is the Austrian's adherence to an explicitly
subjectivist utility theory which is a logically-deduced concept from demonstrated preference.
Objectivists believe that reality is totally outside of human consciousness, although human
reason can be a very accurate guide to that reality. Subjectivists argue that reality is not
simply a collection of objects, standing apart from human consciousness, but a mixture of
those objects and subjective perceptions of them. The Austrians were champions of free
markets, arriving at that position from an entirely different methodological framework than
their British colleagues. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See VON MISES, supra note 14, at 13-14.
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8 Every
disprove" by arguing against the notion, is in itself, an action.'
human action must be recognized as nothing more than an attempted at
raising one's own utility level. 89
The cost of any action is the highest valued opportunity foregone to act
in such a manner."9 The additional satisfaction gained by choosing the
highest ranking goal over that expected by the second most highly ranking
goal is the psychic profit.' 9' Each individual actor hopes to gain this
profit by choosing action he believes will accomplish his most important
end." z

C. INEVITABILITY AND PRIVATE PROPERTY

The Austrian School more soundly establishes the necessity of private
property rights than the argumentatively weaker intuitive or natural law
notions of private property rights as described in Part II and embraced by
the194Constitutional framers 9 a and the early U.S. Supreme Court Justices.
This stronger philosophical case for the inevitability of private property
is made by Austrian Economist Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Ph.D., author of
what has been argued to be the most important book of the decade, for his
argumentation ethic:95
[I]t is obvious... that... a property right in one's own
body must be said to be justified a priori. Anyone who
would try to justify any norm of whatsoever content must
already presuppose an exclusive right of control over his
own body simply in order to say "I propose such and
such." And any one disputing such a right, then, would
be caught up in a practical contradiction since in arguing
so, one would already implicitly have accepted the very
norm that one was disputing."

188. ROTHBARD-STATE, supra note 19, at 1-2.
189. See VON MISES, supra note 14, at 13-14.
190. ROTHBARD-STATE, supra note 19, at 237-38.

191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See Dorn, supra note 67.
194. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 387-88 (1798).
195. N. Stephan Kinsella, The Undeniable Morality of Capitalism,25 ST. MARY'S L.J.
1419, 1420 (1994) (book review).
196. Hans-Hermann Hoppe, The Ultimate Justification of the Private Property Ethic,
LIBERTY, Sept. 1988, at 21 [hereinafter Hoppe-Ultimate].
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By establishing the inevitability of a private property in one's self,
Hoppe continues to do the same for those things necessary to support one's
life.
[I]f a person did not acquire the right of exclusive control
over such goods by homesteading, by establishing some
objective link between a particular person and a particular
scarce resource before anyone else had done so, but instead late-comers were assumed to have ownership claims
to things, then literally no one would be allowed to do
anything with anything unless he had the prior consent of
all late-comers."97
Hoppe concludes that by being alive and formulating any proposition,
one must accept the inevitability of private property. 9 s
D. ACTION AND PROPERTY

Action and property, while individually inevitable, are also inseparably
linked. That action must involve property logically follows because man
must, if nothing else, have a physical place to act even if that action is only
one of standing. 99 All action will involve the use of at least a minimal
amount of property in addition to one's physical being.
Because "actors" use property or scarce resources in ways that can
increase or decrease aggregate utility, it is important to be able to distinguish
between actions that benefit society by increasing utility and those actions
that do not.2'
E. UTILITY

Utility is the economic name given to the satisfaction an individual
actor derives from achieving an end. 20' A common sense or intuitive
approach toward maximizing composite utility in society would involve the
197. Id.
198. Id. at 22 ("If this were not so and the latecomers supposedly had legitimate claims
to things... no one could possibly survive as a physically independent decision-making unit
at any given point in time, and hence no one could ever raise any validity claiming
proposition whatever.").
199. Id. at 21.
200. Logic dictates than in order to increase societal utility, actions, which necessarily
require property, which decrease individual utility, ceteris paribus, would necessarily
decrease aggregate utility and those which increase individual utility, ceteris paribus, would
necessarily increase aggregate utility; see supra notes 191-94
201. MILLER, supra note 26, at 507.
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measuring and summation of all individual utility levels and then enacting
laws that would assure increasing this sum.
However, currently only Austrian School economists seem to realize
that what makes this "measurement" of utility problematic is its purely
The subjectivity of utility makes it impossible to
subjective nature. 2
measure in a cardinal way. With no way to assign cardinal numbers to
levels of utility, any actual summation is simply impossible." 3
This non-cardinal measurability of utility also prohibits interpersonal
One can make only ordinal judgments of utility
comparisons of utility.'
and then only by observing demonstrated preferences by individual
actors. 205 Further, these preferences do nothing to indicate the motive for
any action, only that the action demonstrated is preferable to all others
perceived by the actor as possible at that instant.2
F. TIME PREFERENCE AND UTILITY

Although the subjectivity of utility limits utility analysis greatly, an
additional point with respect to utility can be made. Utility derived from a
present good is necessarily greater than the present expectation of that same
good being realized in the future. 2' Additionally, the utility to which
each individual attributes present goods versus future goods also is subjective and cannot be compared interpersonally.
G. DIMINISHING MARGINAL UTILITY

Another law of utility that is logically true is that of its diminishing
marginal nature. This law simply stated is that each additional unit of a
good subjectively perceived as homogeneous and within the control of the
same individual must necessarily have less utility to him than the previous
unit. 2° This is logically and necessarily true because the first unit of a
homogenous good will always be used to satisfy the most urgent need that
can be satisfied with such a good. 2°
202. See FORMAINI, supra note 43. at 23-25; see also supra note 183.
203. VON MISES, supra note 14, at 97 ("It is vain to speak of any calculation of [utility]
values ... It can be sensed only by the individual. It cannot be communicated or imparted
to any fellow man. It is an intensive magnitude.").
204. ROTHBARD-STATE, supra note 19, at 260.
205. VON MISES, supra note 14, at 96.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 483 ("Satisfaction of a want in the nearer future is, other things being equal,
preferred to that in the farther distant future.").
208. See ROTHBARD-STATE, supra note 19, at 20-21.
209. Id.
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So, while we know that each additional unit is worth less than the
previous unit, due to utility's non-quantifiable nature, 1 ° we once again
cannot measure by how much less. Because of this inability to measure
utility in cardinal terms, it necessarily follows that there can be no
interpersonal comparisons of utility. From this, it also necessarily follows
that the nth unit of a good (to include money) taken from one individual and
transferred to another currently possessing some number of units less than
n is not necessarily composite utility improving.2 ' It is this impossibility
of interpersonal comparability of utility that limits the number of utility
increasing actions (necessarily involving property) to only four.
H. PARETO SUPERIOR ACTIONS

Pareto superior actions are defined as those actions by which "one or
more people are better off (in terms of satisfying utility) ... while no one
is worse off."2 2 These actions move society toward a pareto optimal state
of efficient allocation where no further actions with property can be taken
without making someone else worse off.2" 3 Composite utility increasing
property actions consist only of homesteading, self ownership, production
without externalities (externalities are examined extensively in the portion
of this thesis devoted to force and fraud), and voluntary exchange.2" 4 It
can be logically determined that these actions are pareto superior by
considering the consequences of each.
Homesteading employs a resource that no prior actor has recognized as
scarce or valued highly enough to put to use. The additional production and
utility that results from employment of the new resource increases the utility
of the homesteader without making any other individual worse off.2" 5

210. See FORMAINI, supra note 43, at 23-25.
211. Logic dictates that the inability to measure utility in any cardinal way makes
impossible the premise upon which welfare economics is grounded. That is, because utility
is an intensive magnitude, as opposed to an extensive one, no taking of 100 feet of pipe (for
example) from A (who has 500 feet of pipe) to be given to B (who has only 100 feet of
pipe) can be said to increase societal welfare. We can say, (because pipe is an extensive
magnitude), that B now has 200 feet of pipe but we can never say (because utility is an
intensive magnitude) that the utility B gets from having the additional 100 feet of pipe is
greater than the disutility A suffers from having 100 feet less. The same is true for all goods
including money.
212. See ROTHBARD-ETHICS, supra note 57, at 203.
213. ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS, 581 (2d ed.,

McMillan Publishing Co. 1992) (1989).
214. ROTHBARD-STATE, supra note 19, at 78-79.
215. Id. at 78-80.
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Self-ownership can, in a sense, be justified under the homesteading
principle. It can be thought of as the process by which a specifically human

"spirit" homesteads a previously unused resource, namely the physical
body.

2 16

Production of new goods using one's previously homesteaded or
existing property results in combining less valued goods with the resource
217
of time and labor to produce goods valued more highly than the inputs.
If the producer (engaging in purposeful action) did not value the newly
produced goods (ends) more than the resources employed to produce them,
they would not have been produced. Once again, more highly valued goods
are introduced into the economy making the producer necessarily better off
218
and no one else worse off.

An exception to the premise that production is necessarily pareto
superior is the externality. 21 9 An externality exists when a cost is imposed

220
upon an individual other than the producer imposing the cost.

(Such

actions were legally legitimized by nineteenth and twentieth century courts
in the name of economic progress.)221 Although legally legitimized, this
is a legitimate exception that does indeed prevent production from being
necessarily pareto superior. For this reason, production is classified as
pareto superior only in the absence of externality.
Voluntary exchange also necessarily increases the utility of not only
222
one but at least two individuals without making anyone else worse off.
Because in order for two actors to exchange properties, both must value
more highly what they are receiving over what they are giving in exchange.
In this action, no one else can be made worse off as all other existing
property is unaffected.
216.
217.
218.
219.

II.K.

Id.
Id.
Id.
The externality in the context of this analysis is examined more extensively in part

220. MILLER, supra note 26, at 118.
221. ROTHBARD-LBERTY, supra note 51, at 257 ("Before the mid and late nineteenth
century, any injurious air pollution was considered a tort, a nuisance against which the victim
could sue for damages and against which he could take out an injunction to cease and desist
from any further invasion of his property rights. But during the nineteenth century, the
courts systematically altered the law of negligence and the law of nuisance to permit any air
pollution which was not unusually greater than any similar manufacturing firm, one that was
not more than the customary practice of fellow polluters ... These in effect said, 'Sorry, we
know that industrial smoke... invades and interferes with your property rights. But there
is something more important than mere property rights: and that is public policy, the
common good."') (emphasis added).
222. ROTHBARD-STATE, supra note 19, at 78-80.
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I. MONEY, PRICE, AND THE MARKET PROCESS

Money's emergence results from a series of voluntary exchanges
directed toward obtaining more marketable goods and escaping the double
coincidence of wants problem.223 Because possession of more marketable
goods (eventually money) facilitates further voluntary exchange, both its
emergence and use are necessarily pareto efficient.2"'
Money serves the vital process in an economy of allowing for more
efficient resource allocation. With money it becomes possible to express
any good in terms of any other good. This allows for cost accounting or an
adding together of inputs to compare with the various outputs that could be
produced with the same inputs. This serves as a tool to evaluate and
increase productivity as inputs are directed to their most highly valued
25
uses.
These actions of production and voluntary exchange can both be
considered utility-increasing.226 Information inherently produced by the
of
use of money and the resulting markets can further enhance the number
Ts227must be true because this market
utility-increasing actions.
generated information better indicates what types of production and
exchanges will be most likely to generate profits by reducing scarcity.22 s
Money prices are the basis for this price mechanism; they are an
indication by which resources may be directed to the use that is likely to
generate the most utility. 22 As the supply of a highly demanded good
becomes scarcer, its price in terms of other goods rises. Identification of
this price change provides the insight to producers to divert resources away
223. This problem exists in barter where the owner of product A needs to find a fellowbarterer who not only wants his product A, but also who has the particular product B he
wants in exchange. Here, the owner of product A can still be made better off in an exchange
if he trades for a product C, which is more marketable than his Product A. This is true
because product C provides him more opportunities to trade for the Product B he ultimately
desires than did his product A.
224. See ROTHBARD-STATE, supra note 19, at 78-79. See generally infra part II.H.
225. JOSEPH T. SALERNO, WHY A SOCIALIST ECONOMY ISIMPOSSIBLE 52 (1990) ("Mises's pathbreaking and central insight is that monetary calculation is the indispensable mental
tool for choosing the optimum among the vast array of intricately related production plans
that are available for employing the factors of production within the framework of the social
division of labor. Without recourse to calculating and comparing the benefits of costs of
production using the structure of monetary prices determined at each moment on the market,
the human mind is only capable of surveying, evaluating, and directing production processes
whose scope is drastically restricted to the compass of the primitive household economy.").
226. See ROTHBARD-STATE, supra note 19, at 78-79.
227. See SALERNO, supra note 225.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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from the goods whose prices reflect a lesser demand or a more than
adequate supply.2"
It is important to distinguish between price and value as these terms are
by no means interchangeable. The price sends market signals as mentioned
above. As is the case with any exchange, the actors necessarily value what
they receive in exchange more than the price in money they relinquish.
Logically, if this were not true, no exchange would occur.
J. EFFECTS OF UNCERTAINTY ON SAVINGS AND GROWTH

Growth and long run prosperity can only increase, ceteris paribus,23
as savings or investment increase.232 A society which must devote all of
its present resources to producing the consumer goods necessary to sustain
life from day to day is necessarily stagnant and will enjoy no increase in
prosperity. Only by producing more than it consumes, can it sustain itself
during periods of production of higher order capital goods which once
produced, can be used to produce consumer goods more efficiently.233
Time preference utility theory2" is the limiting disincentive to savings and
its resulting economic growth.235

230. Id.
231. MILLER, supra note 26, at 50. The assumption that all other things are held equal
or constant, except those under study. Id.
232. VON MISES, supra note 14, at 490 ("[P]ostponement of consumption makes it
possible to direct action toward temporally remoter ends. It is now feasible to aim at goals
which could not be thought of before on account of the length of the period of production
required.... Saving is the first step on the way toward improvement of material well being
and toward every further progress on this way). This process is easily demonstrable by using
the following thought experiment using a one-person, Robinson Crusoe style economy.
Suppose Robinson Crusoe spends all of his waking hours catching just enough fish to stay
alive. He may have the knowledge (technology or education) necessary to build a casting
net from the vines that surround him with which he could "net" (pardon the pun) twice as
many fish per hour. However, until he can save enough fish to sustain his life during the
time required to produce the net, he cannot improve his productivity and must spend all of
his waking hours catching fish by hand just to prevent his own starvation. If he saves
enough fish to sustain his life during the production time of the net and in that way converts
the savings to the net, then and only then can he can produce more fish. He then can save
this new surplus for yet another period during which the production of an even more efficient
means of production can be produced.
233. Id.
234. See VON MISES, supra note 14, at 483.
235. Logically, because present consumption of goods always results in more utility
than the expectation of consuming that same good in the future, only a return in excess of
"that same good in the future" justifies a temporary refraining from present consumption.
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Uncertainty plays a major role in the utility increasing aspects of
savings and investment.236 To the extent that savings are not possible to
safeguard or property rights become suspect, a shift from savings to
consumption invariably results and once again economic growth is
curtailed. 237 For this reason, to maximize societal wealth and economic
growth, a legal system must avoid allowing economic liberties to become
subject to force and the uncertainty of procrustean jurisprudential means of
abdication.
K. FORCE, FRAUD, AND EXTERNALITIES

The use of force or fraud to affect any actions mentioned above as

23
pareto superior make them necessarily non-pareto superior. 1 Furthermore, tolerance or initiation of such force by society or the legal system

raises the level of uncertainty, results in relatively higher time preference
levels, and increases present consumption which reduces investment and
future production.239

236. RoTHBARD-STATE, supra note 19, at 52.
237. See VON MISES, supra note 14, at 490; see also supra note 232 for further
analysis. (This is easily demonstrable by returning to the thought experiment of the one
person-economy. Suppose now that the island has become a one-person, one-bear economy
and regardless of where or how Crusoe attempts to secure his surplus fish at the end of the
day, the bear eats the stored fish while Robinson sleeps. Again, the result is a stagnant
economy in which no increase in the standard of living is possible. However, another
significant effect results from Crusoe's realization of this. To the extent the bear is certain
to eat the fish, Crusoe will either consume more fish immediately or fish less, but he will
certainly not save fish. In either case, this shift from a saving and investment economy to
one of pure consumption will prevent any growth in his level of output.
Money (fish) that might have been saved could have been quickly converted to
consumption spending. Fortunately for humankind, humankind's ability to reason has over
time allowed the triumph of reason and technology over nature such that animals like
Crusoe's bear do not destroy "savings." As a result, humankind has moved from less
efficient means of production to more efficient means of production and increased societal
output (wealth). This superior reasoning ability does not, however, eliminate the ugly
menace of expropriation of savings and investment goods by other reasoning animals (namely
other humans) who engage in similarly forceful but far less excusable actions.).
238. MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, POWER AND MARKET, 13-14 (2d ed., 1977) (1970)
[hereinafter ROTHBARD-POWER] ("Coercive intervention ... signifies per se that the
individual or individuals coerced would not have done what they are doing without the
intervention ... the coerced individual loses in utility as a result of the intervention ... All
instances of intervention, then, are cases where one set of men gain at the expense of other
men.").
239. See VON MISES, supra note 14. See also supra notes 232 and 237 for further
analysis.

NORTHERN ILLNOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15

The forced exchange results in one trader being made worse off at the
expense of the other.2m As it is with all forceful interferences, it is
logically irrefutable that the actor employing the force (aggressor) is
increasing his own utility or he would not have engaged in the forceful
action. It is equally true that the recipient of the force (aggressee) is made
worse off. Otherwise, no force would have been necessary to prompt the
exchange."'
Another form of force that is doubly devastating is that of force
initiated to prevent an exchange.2 2 In this case, once again the aggressor
benefits but two other actors are made worse off because they are prevented
from entering into an exchange in which both would necessarily have
benefitted, albeit subjectively.
Forced homesteading would result in employment of a resource whose
value is either regarded as higher when left in a state of nature and unused
or the cost of employment of that resource is more costly than the benefits
to be derived from its use. 3 Logically, if this were not the case, no force
would have been required to bring the resource into production. Threat of
force to restrict homesteading of a resource has an equally devastating utility
reducing effect.2'
Force or forceful restriction in the area of self-ownership results in
something between partial conscription and total slavery. 5 The value of
the individual is necessarily reduced if the voluntary physical uses one can
make with one's own body are reduced in any way. 2'
Forced or forcefully restricted production takes resources away from
production of a more highly valued product and redirects them to a less
desirable use or possibly a use not valued at all.247 Otherwise, once again
no force would be necessary to initiate the change of usage.
Another aspect of the use of force needs to be considered when
examining the action of production. This is not force employed against the

240. See ROTHBARD-POWER, supra note 238.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. See ROTHBARD-POWER, supra note 238.
246. HOPPE-THEORY, supra note 27, at 15 ("[When an owner] ... can no longer decide
on his own, undisturbed by others, to what uses to put his body, the value attached to it by
him is now lower; the want satisfaction, the psychic income, that is to say, which he can

derive from his body by putting it to certain uses is reduced because the range of options
available to him has been limited.").
247. See ROTHBARD-STATE, supra note 19, at 78-79.
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producer but rather force employedby the producer in the act of production

otherwise known as "the externality." 2"
The externality must be limited to force initiated against or affecting
the physical integrity of another individual's property.249 This force can
be an actual physical invasion but must also include a threat of force that in
any way limits the physical uses that an owner might make of his property.'
This "physical integrity" limitation was apparently recognized by
Justice Blackmun in the so-called fundamental liberty case, Bowers v.
Hardwick," in which Blackmun regarded a homosexual act as involving
"no real interference with the rights of others, for the mere knowledge that
other individuals do not adhere to one's value system cannot be a legally
cognizable interest ... let alone an interest that can justify invading the
and minds of citizens who choose to live their lives
houses, hearts,
252
differently.
Fraudulent behavior destroys the utility maximizing characteristics of
pareto superior exchanges. 253 Exchanges entered into while relying on
false information knowingly provided by one of the exchangers results in the
fraudulent actor gaining at the expense of the defrauded individual. 2 4
This defrauded individual will have given up more than would have been
necessary to acquire what he received in the exchange.

248. Id.
249. Logically, the externality to be internally consistent in its application, must not
include the subjective devaluation of a property that has suffered no interference in its
physical integrity. This type of devaluation can occur any time the supply of a similar
property changes or the demand (another individual's subjective interest) in that type of
property changes. Allowing such devaluation resulting from non-physical invasion to be
considered an externality would either require limiting other's physical use of their property
while maintaining the right to use one's own or assume a right to control another's subjective
valuation while assuming a right to one's own subjective valuation in making that judgment.
(Either of which is an internally inconsistent or non-universalizable proposition.).
250. Id.; see, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
In Lucas, the coastal property in question was nearly totally devalued ("regulatory taking")
not by others use of their property or subjective valuations of the coastal property. Rather,
the devaluation resulted from threat of force limiting the physical uses to which the property
owner could put his own land. Here, there is no physical invasion by the aggressor (namely,
the Coastal Commission) only a threat of force affecting the physical uses to which the
property could be put by its owner. Id.
251. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
252. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Blackmun was the
quintessential Procrustean here as his dissent in Lucas, an economic liberty case, recognized
no due process violation. I&.
253. RoTHBARD-POWER, supra note 238, at 245-46.
254. Id.
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If the exchange would have taken place even without the misrepresentation, no fraud (force) would have been employed. All fraud is employed at
a cost to the fraudfeasor because the fraudfeasor will then face an increased
level of skepticism which will have the effect of decreasing the number of
(utility increasing) exchanges he can enter in the future.
In addition to initiation of force rendering otherwise pareto superior
actions non-pareto superior, force, fraud, and externalities have an additional
indirectly devastating effect on the utility increasing ability of individuals.
This devastating effect results because force inhibits the utility enhancing
market process and its resulting price mechanism. 2" Force, as defined
above, redirects resources to less valued uses and the entire value reflecting
6
ability of the market process becomes distorted. 2
L. COLLECTIVE FORCE

Force (and fraud) engaged in by individuals is regarded as criminal
activity. 257 Theft, murder, and kidnapping, while generally considered
criminal in the common law, also can be considered "economically criminal"
or non-pareto superior. 258 While the illegality of such criminal actions as
these are generally justified on moral and ethical grounds, pareto optimal
utility analysis provides justification for their prohibition as well.
It would be a fallacy of composition to-assume that utility, which
cannot be increased other than by the pareto superior activity of individuals,
can somehow be increased by non-pareto superior or forceful actions when
initiated by groups of individuals.259 Only an individual can know the
utility derived from one's own actions and resource use.2' The impossibility of interpersonal comparisons of utility prevent individuals from
knowing the utility of another.26'
But this fallacy of composition is overlooked in maintaining that utility
destroying initiations of force by individuals identified above as criminal
somehow become good for society when they are jointly initiated by a
democratic majority. Utility losses and destructive market-process effects

255. See SALERNO, supra note 225.
256. VON MISES, supra note 14, at 258 ("The [unfettered] market process is the

adjustment of the individual actions of the various members of the market society ... The
market prices tell the producers what to produce, how to produce, and in what quantity ... it
is the center from which the activities of the individuals radiate.").
257. ROTHBARD-LIBERTY, supra note 51, at 23-24.
258. See ROTHBARD-POWER, supra note 238.
259. See ROTHBARD-LIBERTY, supra note 51, at 23-24.
260. See FORMAINI, supra note 43 at 23-25; see also supra note 183 for further analysis.
261. See ROTHBARD-STATE, supra note 19, at 260.
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are identical whether initiation of force is undertaken by individuals or
collectives (groups of individuals).262
It is this above mentioned fallacy of composition, however, that
underlies the utility destroying initiation of collective force employed by the
democratic state in its pursuit of advancement of the "public good or public
interest."2"
M. THEORETICAL CONCLUSION

A legal system that has as its purpose the maximization of societal
utility would be one whose guiding principle would be the encouragement
of pareto superior actions2 and discouragement of individual and collective force.265
The Austrian School Paradigm provides the framework and tools which
can be used to analyze judicial decision's effects on opportunities for Pareto
superior behavior and the resulting overall utility gains by society in its
attempt to move toward the desirable Pareto optimal state. Such a paradigm
must be the basis for a constitutional scrutiny of individual rights in the
legal system. This paradigm, ironically, is exactly the "shibboleth" of
libertarianism 266 for which Justice Holmes held such bitter contempt.267
III. AUSTRIAN SCHOOL THEORY AND THE NON-SEPARABILITY
OF LIBERTIES
A. INDIVIDUAL AS THE UNIT OF ANALYSIS

Citing Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris,26 Justice O'Connor

writes in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communication Commission, 269 "Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply
"Social
components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class. ' 27
scientists may debate how peoples' thoughts and behavior reflect their
background, but the Constitution provides that the Government may not
allocate benefits and burdens among individuals based on the assumption

262. ROTHBARD-POWER, supra note 238, at 15.
263. See Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923).
264. See ROTHBARD-STATE, supra note 19, at 78-79.

265. See ROTHBARD-POWER, supra note 238.
266. See ROTHBARD-LIBERTY, supra note 51.
267. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 63 (1905).
268. 463 U.S. 1073 (1983).
269. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
270. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 602 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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that race or ethnicity determines how they act or think."271 The Court was

"the government entity esteemed above all others to protect the rights of the
272
individual as a counterweight to popular rule.
The Austrian School theorists are in total agreement with Justice
O'Connor's notion that the unit of analysis can only be the individual
actor.273 Only individuals act, only individuals exercise liberty.274 Any
legal rights analysis not cognizant of the individual as the unit of analysis
is plagued with the insurmountable obstacle of the fact that an individual
can at the same time belong to more than one group.275
B. THEORETICAL BASES FOR NON-SEPARABILITY

Given that the individual must be the unit of analysis, six derivative

arguments from the Austrian School theory can be used to demonstrate the
non-separability of so-called fundamental and economic liberties.
1. All Action is Economic
First and most basic, all human actions or exercised liberties are
necessarily economic.2 76 These actions are very simply the pursuit of ends
by the use of scarce resources known as means.277 Every single action by
any individual is an attempt to increase their utility level or reduce
disutility. 27 Even acts of so-called charity are intended to provide a warm
271. Id. (emphasis added).
272. See SIEGAN, supra note 36, at 88.
273. VON MISES, supra note 14, at 42-43 ("All actions are performed by individuals.
A collective operates always through the intermediary of one or several individuals whose
actions are related to the collective as the secondary source. It is the meaning which the
acting individuals and all those who are touched by their action attribute to an action, that
determines its character. The hangman, not the state, executes a criminal ... For a social

collective has no existence and reality outside of the individual member's actions. The life
of a collective is [only] lived in the actions of the individuals constituting its body. Those
who want to start the study of human action from the collective unity encounter an
insurmountable obstacle in the fact that an individual at the same time can belong and-with
the exception of the most primitive tribesman--really belongs to various collective entities.").

274. Id.
275. Id.
276. See VON MISES, supra note 14, at 13-14.
277. Id.
278. VON MISES, supra note 14, at 92-93 ("Thinking man sees the serviceableness of
things, i.e. their ability to administer to his ends, and acting man makes them means. It is
of primary importance to realize that parts of the external world become means only through
the operation of the human mind and its offshoot, human action. Economics is not about

things and tangible material objects; it is about men, their meanings and actions. Goods
commodities, and wealth and all the other notions of conduct are not elements of nature; they
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feeling in one's belly or at least relieve guilt felt for the suffering of
another. 9 To suggest that one action is a fundamental liberty while
another is an economic liberty is to deny the very simple action axiom that
all actions (excepting reflexes) are purely economic. 2,0
In Meyer v. Nebraska,"1 the rights of parents to educate their
children as they saw fit were initially upheld as a right of the individual to
contract to engage in any of the common occupations of life and to acquire
283
useful knowledge 212 but was later cited in Griswold v. Connecticut to
justify the "right to privacy" and the new "fundamental liberty" because
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, "the right of freedom of speech
includes not only the right to utter or to print but the right to distribute, the
-right to receive, the right to read. 2u
So which is it, the right to contract for acquiring useful knowledge or
a fundamental right to receive and read under the First Amendment? The
answer, of course, is WHO KNOWS? Whether education is human capital
accumulation engaged in solely for the purpose of future capital accumula-

are elements of human meaning and conduct. He who wants to deal with them must not
look at the external world; he must search for them in the meaning of acting men.... An
end is everything which men aim at. A means is everything which acting men consider as
such.... Means are necessarily always limited, i.e. scarce with regard to the services for
which man wants to use them. If this were not the case, there would not be any action with
regard to them. Where man is not restrained by the insufficient quantity of things available,
there is no need for any action.").
279. Id. at 241.
280. Id. at 233-34 ("Strictly speaking, people do not long for tangible goods as such,
but for the services which these goods are fitted to render them. They want to attain the
increment in well-being which these services are able to convey. But if this is so, it is not
permissible to excerpt from the orbit of 'economic' action those actions which remove
uneasiness directly without the interposition of any tangible and visible things .... Acting
man is always concerned both with 'material' and 'ideal' things. He chooses between
various alternatives, no matter whether they are to be classified as material or ideal. In the
actual scales of value, material and ideal things are jumbled together. Even if it were feasible
to draw a sharp line between material and ideal concerns, one must realize that every
concrete action either aims at the realization both of material and ideal ends or is the
outcome of choice between something material and something ideal . . . we must not
overlook the fact that in reality no food is valued solely for its nutritive power and no
garment or house solely for the protection it affords against cold weather and rain. It cannot
be denied that the demand for goods is widely influenced by metaphysical, religious, and
ethical considerations, by aesthetic value judgments, by customs, habits, prejudices, tradition,
changing fashions, and many other things.") (emphasis added).
281. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
282. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
283. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
284. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482.
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tion and so-called economic gain or for utility that comes from Von Mises'
"metaphysical, religious, and ethical considerations, by aesthetic value

judgments ' can only be known in the mind of the actor. More troublesome is that it is almost certainly a combination of both motives.
2. All Actions or Liberty Require Property
All action necessarily requires the use of property." 6 Even choosing
physical inactivity, which is itself an action, requires if nothing else a "place
to be. 28 7 It is thus impossible to regulate the use of property without by
definition affecting the actions to which an individual actor may have put
that property.2 88 To suppose that regulation which limits the uses one
makes of one's own body deserves a higher level of judicial protection from
collective force than regulation that limits the property necessary to use
one's body is grossly inconsistent. The point here is that as all action
requires property, regulating property necessarily limits that action. 89
Because "goods, commodities, and wealth" are not elements of nature,
but rather "elements of human meaning and conduct,"2" regulation of
them can never be accomplished with certainty of not regulating away an
individual's means or ends. 29' In fact, what may be purely ends for one
individual may be another individual's means. 92
As soon as the commodities and wealth which the market economy
provides to individuals is limited, all fundamental liberties and bills of rights
become meaningless.2 93 Freedom of' the press is a mere shuck if the

285. See VON MISES, supra note 14, at 233-34; see also supra note 280 and
accompanying text.
286. See HOPPE-Ultimate,supra note 196, at 21.
287. Id.
288. HOPPE-THEORY, supra note 27, at 15 ("Whatever the degree, regulation of property
always, and necessarily so, produces two types of effects. The first effect, 'economic' in the
narrower sense of the term, is a reduction in the amount of investment in human capital.
. Since he [the individual] can no longer decide on his own, undisturbed by others, to what
uses to put his body, the satisfaction, the psychic income, that is to say, which he can derive
from his body by putting it to certain uses is reduced because the range of options available
to him has been limited.").
289. Id.
290. See VON MiSES, supra note 14, at 92-93; see also supra note 278.
291. See VON MIsEs, supra note 14, at 96; see also infra note 401.
292. Id.
293. See VON MIsEs, supra note 14, at 287; see also supra note 15.
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offices and paper plants. 294 "And so are all
authority controls all printing
295
the other rights of men.
In fact, absent property rights and market actions, ability to exercise the
so-called fundamental liberties are lessened due to an increase in the scarcity
of the tools which serve as means.296
3. Personal Devaluation
It is necessarily true that regulation of the uses of property necessarily
limits the uses with which one can put the scarce resource of their own body
to.2" This necessarily devalues the individual as fewer options for the
individual, ceteris paribus, reduces the value of the individual.
If self worth or dignity is to be protected as a fundamental liberty,2 9
a legislature can hardly regulate away options the physical body can be put
In Bowers v.
to without devaluing that individual's self worth.29
Hardwick,3°° rights of privacy were argued by the dissent to be protected
because "a person belongs to himself and not others nor society as a
whole."' 3°' As Hoppe demonstrates, regulation which limits the options a
person can put his bodily property to, necessarily devalues that bodily
Yet this fundamental liberty is expunged by way of economic
property.'
regulation of other property which requires only a "rational basis" justification to be deemed constitutional.
In the case of Lochner v. New York,3 °3 which sparked Holmes dissent
chastising economic theory based constitutional principles, 3° the right of
a baker to engage in what he regarded as a pareto superior exchange or
more work for additional pay. This "economic" regulation effected nothing
more than the physical use to which the laborer could put his body.30 5 On
one hand, bodily integrity is deemed to be a fundamental liberty, 3 6 yet,
294. ROTHBARD-LIBERTY, supra note 51, at 43.
295. See VON MIsES, supra note 14, at 287; see also supra note 15.

296. See supra part II.C.2.
297. See HOPPE-THEORY, supra note 27, at 15; see also supra note 288.
298. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807 (1992).
299. See HOPPE-THEORY, supra note 27, at 15; see also supra note 288.

300. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).

301. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 204 (citing Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians
& Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 777 n.5 (1986)).
302. See HOPPE-THEORY, supra note 27, at 15; see also supra note 288.

303. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

304. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75.
305. The property (ovens, etc.) owned by the baker would have been used to the same
physical degree. Only the particular individual operating them would have been differed.
306. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112
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the baker's own decision to put his body to that particular use would have
been denied by Holmes.3
In the Austrian paradigm, it is plainly recognized that the use to which
the baker intended to put his own body, necessarily involved property. 308
However, in limiting the physical uses to which the laborer could put his
body, his self worth necessarily was diminished, or his human capital if you
will.'
If self worth and dignity are to be protected as fundamental liberties,310 a legislature can hardly regulate away options that the physical
body can be put to without devaluing that individual's self worth.
4. Motive Discernment and Ends/Means Separation Problems
Impossibility of motive discernment makes the procrustean division of
personal and economic liberties even more untenable. Because demonstrated preferences never reveal motive, 31' only preference, 312 no action
could externally be identified as one taken as a means to an end, or an end
3 13
in itself.
This is problematic when the courts give one level of scrutiny to a socalled "fundamental liberty means" exercised for no other purpose than a socalled "economic liberty end" which can be regulated away with mere
rational basis scrutiny. How, without knowing actual motive, is one to
know that what appears to be the exercise of a fundamental liberty end is
no more than the means for an economic end. And conversely, an economic
liberty which may appear to be an economic end in itself, may be nothing
more than economic fodder necessary to exercise the fundamental right of
expression on a grander scale.3t4 (Free, speech is after all not "free" in the
economic sense). For this reason, different levels of judicial scrutiny
become totally meaningless.

S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
307. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75.
308. See HOPPE-Ultimate,supra note 196, at 21 (All actions do, of course!).
309. Id.
310. See Planned Parenthood, 112 S. Ct at 2807.
311. See VON MISES, supra note 14, at 96 (stating that these preferences do nothing to
indicate the motive for any action, only that the action demonstrated is preferable to all other
perceived by the actor as possible at that instant).
312. Id.
313. See VON MISES, supra note 14, at 92-93; see also supra note 280.
314. Capital accumulation may be accomplished for the purpose of exercising a socalled economic liberty (i.e., opening a furniture store) or a so-called personal liberty (i.e.,
seeing a fertility doctor). Should the means of capital accumulation be given different levels
of scrutiny depending upon its intended purposeful end?!
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Realistically, since the time required to exercise a personal liberty such
as free speech is scarce (not free), it is quite reasonable to expect that a
personal liberty such as free speech is seldom, if ever, exercised as a means
for anything other than what would, under the procrustean scheme, be
regarded as an economic end.
Only because free speech serves as a tool or means of achieving
political ends that, in turn, often serve to attain purely economic benefit,
(which all actions do),315 does it have any inherent value worth constitutionally protecting. Only by knowing the motive of the individual actor and
whether an action is an end or a mean, could we sort out a so-called
economic liberty from a so-called personal liberty.316 But we can never
know the motive of another actor.317 Motive is after all, solely in the
mind of the individual.31 Even the action of declaring the action of a
certain motive would prove useless other than to suppose the declarer
prefers the listener to associate that motive with the action.
This impossibility of sorting this out is clearly demonstrated in the case
3" 9 In
of Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight.

Noerr, the high Court unanimously held that understandings and agreements
among competitors that could traditionally be regarded as an illegal
conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act were beyond the reach
of the statute if they constituted attempts to influence government decisions.32 Here, the fundamental freedom of expression was engaged in
solely for the purpose of eliminating competition and economic benefit
which, once achieved, would have been subject to a significantly lower level
of scrutiny. The "sham" exception 32' was apparently included in an
attempt to deal with the procrustean impossibility and absurdity.
5. Fundamentaland Economic Reverse Utility Preferences

Demonstrated preference and voluntary exchange suggest that so-called
economic and personal liberty cannot be treated with different levels of
scrutiny as neither are inherently more or less valuable. The pareto superior
societal utility increase of voluntary exchanges322 exists only because both
actors value that which they receive in the exchange more than that which
315.
316.
317.
318.

See VON MISES, supra note 14, at 13-14 (All actions are economic).
See supra note 314.
See VON MISES, supra note 14, at 96.
Id.

319. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).

320. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. at 136.
321. Id. at 144.
322. See RoTHBARD-STATE, supra note 19, at 78-79.
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is foregone. This reverse utility preference is what prompts an exchange in
the first place. But this necessarily means that the parties to the exchange
have reverse value preferences.
To suppose that so-called personal liberties warrant a higher level of
judicial protection from the tyranny of the majority exercised by the
democratic legislative process is to suppose that they are of more value to
society than so-called economic liberties. The unit of analysis, of course,
must remain the individual. 323 The fact that every exchange involving the
trading of one type of liberty for the other demonstrates that at least one
trading partner values the so-called economic good more than the so-called
fundamental liberty and the other values the fundamental liberty more than
the economic good. That such an exchange ever takes place demonstrates
that either liberty's preferred valuation is necessarily non-existent.
Everyday exchanges such as employment contracts demonstrate that
employees forego (at least temporarily) certain fundamental liberties in
exchange for what are regarded as purely economic benefits, namely money.3" As an example, free speech and freedom from search and seizure
in voluntary drug testing agreements are often foregone by the employee as
part of the exchange."
For years, so-called fundamental liberties have been exchanged for
mere economic benefit. In famous contract law cases, a nephew entered
into a voluntary exchange to refrain from engaging in such fundamental
liberties as swearing (freedom of expression) Hamer v. Sidway,326 and
consumption of liquor 27 or as in Earle v. Angel 3 2 where, again a nephew, agreed to accept $500 to forego a future "right to travel" elsewhere by
attending a funeral service.329 It is clear that fundamental liberties are
often foregone in exchange for "mere economic benefit." But the opposite
must be true of parties who refuse to enter such exchanges. It is only
because they value the fundamental liberty to be foregone more than the
economic benefit to be offered that they refuse to enter such exchanges. No
basis for preferred protection of so-called fundamental liberties could

323. See VON MISES, supra note 14, at 42-43; see also supra note 273.
324. Travel, free speech, drug testing, and to some extent even reproductive rights may
be temporarily or not so temporarily foregone in the process of engaging in voluntary
employment contracts.
325. See supra note 324.
326. 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891).
327. Hamer, 27 N.E. at 256.
328. 32 N.E. 164 (Mass. 1892).
329. Earle, 32 N.E. at 164.
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possibly be justified on value to society grounds in light of the reverse
utility preferences prompting these exchanges.
6. Universality Principle Problem
Unless so-called fundamental liberties are reconciled within the
framework of property rights, the resources required to engage in these
liberties (demand) will always exceed the supply of such resources. Alleged
rights, be they economic or otherwise, cannot be recognized as rights unless
they can be "universalized" or enjoyed by all individuals simultaneously
without being internally contradictory.33
Absent property rights and the market mechanism, demand for the tools
of free speech, paper and ink, for example, will always exceed supply with
no universalizable means of rationing.331 It would be possible to universalize a right to all the air time or newspaper coverage one can obtain by
voluntary exchange on a free market. However, absent that right being
subject to consent of a property owner, a right to speak from a certain
physical location is by definition non-universal simply because two physical
bodies cannot occupy the same place at the same time and all liberties require at least some minimal amount of property in which to be engaged.332
As such, no right status can be granted.
Any according of rights status to a right of expression aside from the
recognition of the necessarily accompanying property right, leads to the
rationing problem.333 A scarce resource, if not allocated by price, must be
allocated by some other means by its owner. But to the extent this resource
allocation is negated and made free to any potential user, the demand for
obtaining this time or space is bound greatly to exceed the supply, and
hence a perceived "shortage" of the resource is bound to develop."
Although generally this resource allocation problem tends to be one of
allocation of government property remedied by time, place, and manner
restrictions, in the truest sense, this is simply unsatisfactory. Time
preference 335 and subjective utility theory 3 6 dictate that even the same
physical location at different times is necessarily a different good. Thus, the
right to speak from a public podium restricted by different time restraints is
not a resolution of the universality problem at all.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

See HOPPE-PROPERTY, supra note 79.
ROTHBARD-ETHICS, supra note 57, at 115-16.
See HoPPE-Ultimate,supra note 196, at 21.
See ROTHBARD-ETHICS, supra note 57, at 115-16.
Id.
See VON MisEs, supra note 14, at 483.
See FORMAINI, supra note 14, at 23-25; see also supra note 183.
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Courts, in the Procrustean tradition of protecting fundamental liberties
to a greater degree than economic liberties, have reached absurd results. In
PruneyardShopping Center v. Robins,33 7 government courts misallocated
a mall owner's property to paid petitioners under the guise of fundamental
freedom of speech!338
C. SECONDARY EFFECTS OF THE PROCRUSTEAN SEPARATION SCHEME

1. Uncertainty and Economic Stagnation
The arbitrary judicial decisions bleeding from embracement of the
impossible Procrustean separation scheme result in more uncertainty in
judicial outcomes. While "[liberty is argued to find no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt,"339 it is axiomatic that economic growth finds no
refuge when property rights are suspect. 34 To the extent an impossibly
arbitrary separation scheme is embraced by the courts, certainty of property
rights are suspect at best. As property rights become suspect, a shifting
from investment to consumption spending is certain. 3" Equally certain is
that this shift away from investment necessarily results in lower levels of
economic growth than would have been possible absent the shift. 2
One schizophrenic effect exists with the Court's treatment of certain
educational rights as fundamental liberties,2 while at the same time,
making property rights suspect. Education requires savings.'
Yet,
increased savings necessary for education require certainty in property
rights. 345 To afford the necessary condition of savings (the means), less
judicial protection than education (the end), is totally inconsistent and, well,
Procrustean. Education (human capital accumulation), like other forms of
capital accumulation, requires savings to rely upon for minimal consumption
during the period of accumulation until the increased consumption
production is realized from the new capital accumulation. 3 6

337. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
338. PruneyardShopping Center, 447 U.S. at 91.
339. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2803 (1992).
340. See ROTHBARD-STATE, supra note 19, at 52.
341. See VON MisEs, supra note 14, at 490; see also supra note 232.
342. Id.; see also ROTHBARD-STATE, supra note 19, at 52.
343. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
344. See supra note 232. Education (production of human capital) requires savings so
consumption can be foregone during this period of (human) capital accumulation. Id.
345. See ROTHBARD-STATE, supra note 19, at 52.
346. See VON MisEs, supra note 14, at 490; see also supra note 232.
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2. Fundamental Liberties Necessarily Reduced
All liberties of action require property. 3 7 Freedom of the press is
meaningless without ink, paper and press.'
Common sense dictates that
unrestricted abortion is meaningless without a physician to perform the
procedure and the right to travel is diminished without efficient means of
transportation.
Absent the increased production from savings and investment resulting
from certainty of property rights, supplies of such means of exercising socalled fundamental liberties will likewise fall 3' 9 against a steady demand
curve, ceteris paribus.
The law of marginal utility defines that the demand curve is downward
sloping3 ° and a diminished supply against this demand curve invariable
results in higher prices for such goods. 351' At higher prices, less tools
necessary to exercise fundamental liberties will be available or consumed 352 and as such, ceteris paribus, the reduction in economic liberties
and property rights necessarily brings with it diminished exercising of socalled fundamental liberties. This is certainly not to say the exercising of
fundamental liberties are reduced for everyone at the same relative rate.
Rather, as fewer means become available as property rights become
suspect and, in turn, available only at relatively higher prices,353 fundamental liberties become relatively more accessible to the wealthy and
relatively less available to the economically disadvantaged. So in addition
to overall liberties being decreased, so also is there a shift in the de facto
ability to exercise these "rights."
In the case of Griswold v Connecticut,3 4 in which the "fundamental"
right to privacy was concocted, a dichotomy between regulating the
manufacture and sale of contraceptive devices rather than simply their
use 355 was curiously mentioned. But absent the right to engage in the
pareto superior action of contraceptive device production, which obviously

347. See HOPPE-Ultimate,supra note 196, at 21.
348. See VON MisEs, supra note 14, at 287; see also supra note 15.
349. See VON MisEs, supra note 14, at 490; see also supra note 237.
350. See ROTHBARD-STATE, supra note 19. The demand curve is logically derived as
downward sloping as it describes graphically cost on the vertical axis and quantity consumed
on the horizontal axis. The downward slope describes the inverse relationship between cost
and quantity consumed derived from this law of diminishing marginal utility. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
355. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
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brings such devices into the marketplace, to what extent is the privacy right
of using these contraceptive devices meaningful in any way?
3. Efficient Resource Allocation Problem
Because economic regulation often, as in Nebbia,356 results in the
creation of a board of "central planners," staffed by self-interested representatives of the industry behind the regulation,357 overall societal efficiency
declines. 358 Abandonment of market prices which are necessarily eliminated by these central planners in their initiation of collective force 359 through
the state, destroys the market signal36 by which resources may be directed
362
361
to the use that is likely to generate the most utility. ' As in Nebbia,
instead of resources being diverted away from milk production as profits
were likely falling due to an abundance of supply and to areas of production
where relative scarcity was experienced, 6 3 the effect of the "three men at
headquarters "
was to shift resources where too many were already
misallocated and, as importantly, away from an area of industry lacking such
365

resources.

D. EVEN RATIONAL BASIS SCRUTINY BARS SOCIO-ECONOMIC REGULATION

Upon recognition that so-called fundamental and economic liberties are
inextricably intertwined, the question remains as to which level of judicial
scrutiny is appropriate for legislative limits on liberties. The current
judicially-recognized choices are the rational relation test, 366 a stricter
scrutiny requiring narrowly tailored means to achieve a compelling state
interest367 (as used for the so-called fundamental liberties), and an intermediate 368 or alternative level of scrutiny.

356.
357.
358.
359.
360.

Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
See generally WEINSTEIN, supra note 60.
See SALERNO, supra note 225.
Id.
Id.

361. Id.

362. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
363. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 558 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).

364. Id.

365.
366.
367.
368.
(1973).

See VON MISES, supra note 14, at 258; see also supra note 256.
See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88.
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
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The Austrian School's strict adherence to the subjective utility
analysis"6 dictates that regardless of which of the currently-recognized
levels of scrutiny are chosen, the outcome always remains protective of
liberty even in the Madisonian sense of the property in rights.37 °
Even the rational relation test would require that a rational basis exist
for the deprivation of liberty within the context of the state's preservation
of morals, welfare, etc. If truly underlying these socio-economic regulations
is an overall benefit to society, no rational basis for limiting liberties
identified as pareto-efficient 37' could ever exist.
Legislation of this type is by definition collective force. 372 Because
cardinal quantification of utility is impossible,373 and in turn, so are
interpersonal comparisons of utility, 374 no rational basis could ever exist
for enacting what is by definition redistributionist ("a law takes property
from A and gives it to B") 375 legislation.
Absent knowing that the increase in marginal utility to those benefitted
more than offsets the marginal utility decrease to the burdened, one could
never know that the winners gained more utility than the losers lost as a
result of the initiation of this collective force. 376 As in Nebbia,377 no
rational basis exists for knowing that consumers and retailers (each engaging
in voluntary exchange and each necessarily benefitting) ultimately jointly
lose less from the prohibition of free exchange than the dairy producers gain
by their using the collective force of government to establish an artificial
minimum selling price for what many would regard as a "necessity of life,"
namely milk.378 Common law notions of contract and tort would still
afford protection and damage awards for initiation of individual force, fraud,
and externalities. Within the Austrian Paradigm, legislation regarding the
penalties to be imposed for initiation of individual force and fraud (as
regarded by Bastiat 379 as the proper role of government legislation) might
still be "rational" for the state to regulate.
Any regulation not designed to implement these either retributionist or
restitutionist "punishments" for initiations of force are thus inherently
369. See FORMAINI, supra note 43, at 23-25; see also supra note 183.

370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.

Dom, supra note 67, at 3.
See ROTHBARD-ETHICS, supra note 57.
See ROTHBARD-POWER, supra note 238, at 15.
See FORMAINI, supra note 43 at 23-25; see also supra note 183.
See ROTHBARD-STATE, supra note 19, at 260.
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 387-88 (1798).
See ROTHBARD-POWER, supra note 238, at 15.
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
Id. at 542.
See BASTIAT-LAW, supra note 63, at 6.
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irrational within the principles of the subjective utility theory and freemarket-, non-interventionary- favoring Austrian School.3 ° Prohibition of
all other legislative redistributional schemes are deemed by the Austrian
Paradigm to be inherently irrational, unless of course, minimizing societal
wealth is the judicially desired "rational" end.
CONCLUSION

The Court's role in the check and balance system of federalism is
intended to serve as a check on the majoritarian abuses of power exercised
through the legislative, executive, and now administrative branch violations
of individual rights.38 ' Without a sound scientific framework by which
these various actions by the legislative, executive and administrative
branches of the state can be analyzed by the Court for their right protecting
safe, or as the short history of this country has
savvy, no right is sacred,
38 2
salvaged.
demonstrated,
Justice Holmes, in his dissenting opinion in Lochner,38 3 suggested
disassociating economic science from constitutionality considerations. Yet,
it is the praxeology-based Austrian School of Economics with its strict
adherence to subjective utility theory that provides the ideal scientific
framework 3" to avoid the pitfalls of what constitutional scholar Siegan
describes as a "collection of catchwords and catch phrases which would fill
pages but would not be helpful in establishing guidelines. 3 5
The logically irrefutable axioms of the Austrian School of Economics
demonstrate that the Procrustean separation of so-called fundamental and
economic liberties is impossible,38 6 ludicrous, destructive of all liberties, " and results in a lower standard of living for all.38 8

380. See FORMAINI, supra note 43, at 23-25; see also supra note 183.
381. See SIEGAN, supra note 36, at 88.
382. See supra part I.B.
383. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905).
384. See supra part II.A-M.
385. See SIEGAN, supra note 36, at 208.
386. See supra part III.B.
387. See supra part III.C.2.
388. See VON MISES, supra note 14, at 839 "We may fully endorse the religious and
ethical precepts that declare it to be man's duty to assist his unlucky brethren whom nature
has doomed. But the recognition of this duty does not answer the question concerning what
methods should be resorted to for its performance. It does not enjoin the choice of methods
which would endanger society and curtail the productivity of the human effort. Neither the
able-bodied nor the incapacitated would derive any benefit from a drop in the quantity of
goods available." (emphasis added); see also part III.C.1.3.
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The Austrian School demonstrates this impossibility of Procrustean
separation of liberties because 1) All actions are necessarily economic;" 9
2) exercising any liberty requires an accompanying property right (a socalled economic liberty); ° 3) the so-called fundamental liberty of self
worth is necessarily devalued whenever so-called economic liberties are
restricted;39 ' 4) impossibility of ends/means identification makes any socalled economic regulation violative of fundamental liberties; 3 2 5) commonplace exchanges demonstrate that neither fundamental or economic
liberties are more highly valued; 393 and 6) the universality principle of
rights identification makes a right to so-called fundamental liberties logically
impossible without an accompanying property rights condition.39
Additionally, even if this Procrustean separation scheme were somehow
possible, economic regulation, under Austrian subjective utility paretooptimality analysis, is nothing other than collective force which will not
3 95
withstand even the minimal scrutiny level of the "rational basis test.
This framework of analysis clearly demonstrates that because interpersonal
comparisons of utility cannot be executed, 39 wealth redistribution in the
name of the common good or public interest is arbitrary at best and has no
scientific justification, and is an inherently irrational means to any genuine
"public interest" end.39
But are economic tenets of the Austrian School reconcilable with
notions of justice enunciated by United States Supreme Court Justices?
Consider the similarity of the following quotations:
Property does not have rights. People have rights. The
right to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no
less than the right to speak or the right to travel, is in
truth, a "personal" right. . . . In fact, a fundamental
interdependence exists between the personal right to
liberty and the personal right in property. Neither could
have meaning without the other.39 '
-Justice
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.

Stewart, U.S. Supreme Court, 1972, and

See supra part III.B.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra part III.B.
See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88.
See ROTHBARD-STATE, supra note 19, at 260.
See ROTHBARD-POWER, supra note 238, at 13-14.
Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
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In the first place, there are two senses in which property
rights are identical with human rights: one, that property
can only accrue to humans, so that their rights to property
are rights that belong to human beings; and two that a
persons right to his own body, his personal liberty, is a
property9 right in his own person as well as a "human
3
right."
-Dr.'Murray

N. Rothbard, Austrian Economist, 1982.

"[H]uman rights, when not put in terms of property rights, turn out to
be vague and contradictory, causing liberals to weaken those rights on
This quotation aptly
behalf of 'public policy' or the 'public good."'"
in these twentieth
Jurisprudence
describes in one sentence Procrustean
century United States as well as the justification for its immediate and total
obliteration. Only by repealing this century's Procrustean jurisprudence of
doubt, may individual rights to life, liberty, and property be restored and the
accompanying pursuit of utility reinstated.
For a new liberty,

4 1
0

JOSEPH BECKER

399. ROTHBARD-ETHICS, supra note 57, at 113.
400. Id.
401. On the evening of January 7, 1995, as I was feverishly perusing Rothbard's "Man,
Economy, and State," supra note 19, for discussion of the idea supported by footnote 285,
my telephone rang. Most regrettably, it was Professor Hoppe, author supra notes 27, 79, and
196, who had telephoned to inform me that my mentor and Thesis Chair, Dr. Rothbard, S.J.
Hall Distinguished Professor of Economics, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, and author
supra notes 19, 51, 57, and 238, had died of a sudden heart attack in New York City, earlier
that day. Dr. Rothbard was a champion of liberty in the truest sense. Hopefully, humanity
will never lose the insight into liberty that was uniquely his; I will certainly miss his
friendship, his intellectual leadership, and his seemingly unending inspiration in the battle
against statism of every "type."
This comment is dedicated to that giant of liberty to whom I owe a huge intellectual debt,
Murray N. Rothbard, Ph.D.

